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Gun control advocatesfrequently attempt to deflect the Second Amendment by claiming that the Amendment merely
guarantees a "state's right." But gun control advocates never
explain what they mean when they claim that the Second
Amendment guaranteesa right to state governments, ratherthan
a right of the people. In this article, the authors attempt to flesh
out exactly what a "state's right" interpretation of the Second
Amendment would mean. They conclude that taking the Second
Amendment seriously as a state's right has enormous implications, which have not been addressed by anti-gun advocates.
This article was originallypublished in 1995 in volume 36 of the
William and Mary Law Review, beginning at page 1737.

The Second Amendment And States'
Rights: A Thought Experiment
Glenn Harlan Reynoldsa
Don B. Kates'
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed."' As Professor Sanford Levinson
has noted, this Amendment is, on its face at least, one of the
murkier constitutional provisions. 2 In recent years, the public
debate over the meaning of the Amendment has become more
heated, even as the scholarly literature has grown. One major
feature of this debate has been disagreement over what the Second Amendment protects. The great majority of recent. law
review commentary sees the Amendment as recognizing a right
of individuals, enforceable by them in the courts after the fashion of, say, the First Amendment. 3 While acknowledging that,
like freedom of expression, the right to arms was perceived as
having social values as well as individual ones,4 the scholarly
literature portrays the Amendment as intimately connected with
self-defense, which the Founders saw as the cardinal natural
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right-a right of individual and collective resistance to tyranny
and other forms of criminal conduct. 5 In contrast to the individual rights view, advocates of restricting gun ownership have
championed a "states' right" view of the Second Amendment,
contending that its goal is to guarantee only the states' right to
have armed militias, usually characterized as the contemporary
National Guard.6
We will not enter that debate in this Article. Instead, we
will undertake what physicists term a "thought experiment." We
will take as a given that the Second Amendment does what
states' rights advocates say it does, protecting only the right of
states to maintain organized military forces such as the militia
and the National Guard, without creating any rights enforceable
by ordinary individuals. We will then explore an issue that has
been ignored even by proponents of the "states' rights" interpretation of the Second Amendment: If the Second Amendment
grants rights to states, rather than individuals, what exactly are
those rights, and what are the consequences for the Constitution
and other aspects of state and federal relations? The answers to
these questions turn out to be rather startling and likely will displease gun control advocates every bit as much as their
opponents. From this conclusion we draw a few lessons on the
contemporary state of popular constitutional scholarship and
make a modest proposal for improving matters.
I. States' Rights And Individual Rights
We all know what it means to say that the Bill of Rights creates an individual right. It means that the provision in questionfor example, the First Amendment's free-speech clause--carves
out an area that is exempt from government control, except perhaps in the most compelling circumstances. 7 Individuals whose
rights are violated because the government subjects protected
behavior to control absent such compelling circumstances have
the right to sue and obtain an injunction or other judicial relief
against the government. The meaning of an individual right to
bear arms under the Second Amendment would thus be fairly
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clear. An individual subjected to firearms laws not justified by
highly compelling circumstances would be able to have the laws
struck down by a court as unconstitutional.8 Such laws would be
analyzed in the same fashion as laws entrenching upon other
rights protected by the Bill of Rights.
What a states' right interpretation would mean is a bit less
clear. The Supreme Court has not done much with states' rights
in recent years, and the term itself still suffers a certain amount
of opprobrium resulting from its use (more as slogan than legal
argument) in the civil rights battles of the 1950s and 1960s. 9 Nor
is the Constitution very helpful. Typically, when describing state
functions that are protected from federal interference (or, for
that matter, when describing governmental authority generally)
it uses the term "powers," rather than rights, as in the Tenth
Amendment.1°
Presumably, however, a "state's right" is one that is also enforceable in court. Thus the Supreme Court consistently
enforces the states' Eleventh Amendment "right" not to be sued
in federal courts." ! By the same token, if Congress were to pass a
statute establishing a new state of "Calizona" out of parts of
California and Arizona without the consent of the legislatures of
those states, the courts likely would strike down such an action
as violative of the provision in Article IV, section 3 that "no new
State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any
other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or
more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned"' 2 The right of territorial
integrity guaranteed by Article IV would hardly be a right at all
if courts did not enforce it.
Thus, a states' right interpretation of the Second Amendment must mean-if it is to mean anything at all-that a federal
action that invades a state's protected interests can be challenged
in court, and that it can be struck down where it is not justified
by highly compelling circumstances. This, of course, leaves
open two important questions. The first question is what state
interests, exactly, are protected by a "states' rights" interpretation of the Second Amendment. The second question is what are
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the consequences of recognizing such rights today. In addressing
these questions, we first will look at the purposes such a right
might serve, then at how it might be applied today, and finally at
the relationship between states and the federal government that
such an interpretation implies.
II. A State Right To Keep And Bear Arms
In trying to determine the purposes of a state right under the
Second Amendment, the obvious place to look first is In the
writings of those who champion such an interpretation. 3 Unfortunately, they provide little help. The states' right
interpretation appears to be employed against the individual
right interpretation in much the same fashion as a chain of garlic
against a vampire, pulled out and brandished at need but then
hastily tossed back into the cellar lest its odor offend.
However, even in this commentary there is some guidance.
For example, gun-control activist Dennis Henigan 14 writes that
"[t]he purpose of the [Second] Amendment was to affirm the
people's right to keep and bear arms as a state militia, against
the possibility of the federal government's hostility, or apathy,
toward the militia."' 5 He describes his interpretation of the Second Amendment as providing ."that the Second Amendment
guarantees a right of the people to be armed only in service to an
organized militia"'16 and argues that James Madison interpreted
the Amendment as ensuring that the Constitution does not strip
the states of their militia, while conceding that a strong, armed
militia is necessary as a military counterpoint to the power of the
regular standing army Madison saw the militia as the military instrument of state government, not simply as a collection of
unorganized, privately armed citizens. Madison saw the armed
citizen as important to liberty to the extent that the citizen was
part of a military force organized by state governments, which
possesses the people's "confidence and affections" and "to
which the people are attached." This is hardly an argument
for
17
the right of people to be armed against government per se.
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So in Henigan's view, which it seems safe to regard as representative of the "states' rights" camp,' 8 the purpose of the
Second Amendment is to guarantee the existence of state military forces that can serve as a counterweight to a standing
federal army. Thus, it seems fair to say, the scope of any rights
enjoyed by the states under the Second Amendment would be
determined by the goal of preserving an independent military
force not under direct federal control.
The consequences of such a right are likely to be rather radical. In short, if the Second Amendment protects only a state
right to maintain an independent military force, it creates no
purely individual right to keep and bear arms, exactly as guncontrol proponents argue (although it is possible that courts
might derive some individual rights by way of inference). However, the consequences go far beyond that particular result. If the
Second Amendment creates a right on the part of the states,
rather than individuals, then by necessity it works a pro tanto
repeal of certain limitations on state military power found in the
Constitution proper, renders the National Guard unconstitutional, at least as currently constituted, and creates a power on
the part of state legislatures to nullify federal gun-control laws,
if such laws are inconsistent with that state's scheme for organizing its militia. Although these results may seem far-fetched,
closer examination will reveal that they are inevitable results of
a states' right formulation.
A. An Independent State Military Power
Advocates of the states' right view are certainly on firm
ground when they describe the Framers' fear of a standing federal army. The evidence that the Framers entertained such fears
is substantial and uncontradicted.19 The individual rights view
does not deny this. It sees the right as an aspect of the naturallaw right of self-defense, which was deemed to include the right
to arms and which ("writ large") included the right of an armed
populace to join together to resist tyranny. The difference between the two views is that the individual right approach has no
7
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particular state versus federal implications. Indeed, one additional aspect of the armed populace was their20 ability to join the
federal government in resisting state tyranny.
But if the Second Amendment was designed to create an independent state counterweight to federal military power, then it
must at the very least protect those aspects of state military
forces that are independent and that serve as counterweights to
federal power. Those aspects turn out to be substantial. To begin
with, a states' right version of the Second Amendment is probably inconsistent with some provisions of the preamendment
Constitution; because it is later in time, it must thus be viewed
as an implicit repeal or modification of those provisions. Three
pre-amendment provisions of Article I appear inconsistent with
the role of state armed forces as independent counterparts to the
federal standing army. Article I, section 8, clause 15 (the first of
the Militia Clauses) grants to Congress the power: To provide
for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions. 21 Article I, section 8,
clause 16 (the other Militia Clause) grants Congress the power:
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia,
and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the
Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively,
the appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. 22 Finally, Article I, section 10, clause 3 provides that: No State shall,
without the Consent of the Congress, keep Troops, or Ships of
War in time of Peace.23
What is wrong with these provisions? In the states' right
formulation, we know two things about them. First, they were
not sufficient in themselves to address concerns that state military forces might be under too much federal control- otherwise
the Second Amendment would not have been needed. Indeed,
these provisions helped give rise to precisely the kind of fears
that the states' right interpretation claims the Second Amendment was intended to address. Second, they are in many ways
inconsistent with the states' rights theory's stated purpose of the
Second Amendment, because some of the powers granted to the
8
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federal government in Article I, and some of the prohibitions
imposed on the states, might destroy or impair the role of state
military forces as a counterweight to the federal standing army.
The calling-out provision of clause 15 is the least suspect.
Here, if the Second Amendment works any change at all, it
would simply prevent the federal government from calling out
state military forces in a way that would effectively end state
control-for example, a perpetual call-up that would have the
effect of placing the state forces under long-term federal command, destroying their independence. Note, however, that the
clause does contain limitations on the purpose for which the militia can be called out, limiting such call-outs to execution of the
laws, suppression of insurrections, and repelling invasions. 24
Clause 16, having to do with organization, arming, and discipline, is on shakier ground. According to Henigan, the Framers
worried that congressional authority in this regard might allow
the federal government to undermine or destroy the militia as an
institution either by refusing to make any provision for arming,
disciplining, or training the militia or by warping it into a federal
rather than a state institution. 25 Indeed, the crux of his argument
is that the Second Amendment was intended to address precisely
this concern. 26 Thus, under a states' rights view, the authority of
Congress to regulate the arming, discipline, or training of the
state militia would be limited by the Second Amendment's purpose of maintaining state militias as an independent force that
citizens correctly would identify as belonging to their state government, rather than as a federal institution. Accordingly, any
regime providing for systems of arming, training, or disciplining
state forces that is inconsistent with such a purpose would be
unconstitutional. For example, a rule that state militias could be
armed only from federally-controlled armories, or trained only
with "dummy" or non lethal weapons, or that they must be overseen by federal political officers to ensure loyalty to the United
States, would violate the independence of state military forces
and thus the Second Amendment.27
The Second Amendment also raises questions with regard to
Article I, section 10's prohibition on states' maintaining troops
9
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or ships of war without the consent of Congress. If the Second
Amendment is intended to preserve a measure of state military
independence, then a prohibition on state military forces is
surely suspect, and might be regarded as having been implicitly
repealed by the Second Amendment. However, it is possible to
avoid at least the "Troops" part of this problem by distinguishing between "Troops," who are probably meant to be regular
professional soldiers, and the "Militia," which28 was always a
part-time body drawn from the citizenry at large.
Thus, it is possible to read these two provisions together as
protecting the independence of a state militia made up of citizens while prohibiting the maintenance of full-time, professional
armed forces by the states. Given that the Second Amendment
resulted in large part from a fear of standing armies, this reading
makes sense and avoids any conflict between the two provisions.
Unfortunately, it runs afoul of the basic philosophy behind the
states' right approach. 29
Both sides in the modem Second Amendment debate recognize that Madison proposed, and the Federalist First Congress
passed, the Bill of Rights in response to Antifederalist criticism
of the Constitution. Unlike the individual right view, however,
the states' right view presupposes the Amendment's hostility to
parts of the Constitution to which the Antifederalists were
deeply opposed. The Antifederalists had opposed ratification of
the Constitution on two very different kinds of grounds. One involved deep suspicion about specific provisions, particularly
those allowing a standing army and providing for federal supervision of the militia. 30 Entirely independent of those specifics,
the Antifederalists, and many other Americans, were critical of
the failure to append to the Constitution a charter of basic human rights that the federal government could not infringe under
any circumstances. 3'
The individual right view sees the Second Amendment, and
the Bill of Rights in general, as responding to this second kind of
criticism. During the ratification debate, the Federalists vehemently denied that the federal government would have the power
to infringe freedom of expression, religion, and other basic
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rights-expressly including the right to arms.32 In this context,
Madison secured ratification by his commitment to support the
addition by amendment of a charter that would guarantee basic
rights. But that commitment extended only to safeguarding the
fundamental rights that all agreed should never be infringed. It
did not involve conceding any issue on which the Federalists and
Antifederalists disagreed, i.e., the later's opposition to specific
provisions of the Constitution. Indeed, a few days after their
submission, Madison said he had "deliberately proposed
amendments that would not detract from federal powers, among
them a right for the citizenry to be armed. 33
In contrast, the states' right view points to the Militia Clause
of the Second Amendment as evidence that the Amendment embodies Antifederalist opposition to the Militia Clauses of Article
I. Thus, despite the general presumption that ordinarily differing
provisions of the Constitution and/or its amendments ought to be
harmonized whenever possible, the states' right view freights the
Second Amendment with a presumption that it conflicts with,
and therefore repeals, or at least modifies, some aspects of the
original Constitution.
It is inescapable, then, that the states' right interpretation of
the Second Amendment implies the repeal or modification of
other language in the Constitution-something that Henigan
admits, albeit without giving any examples. 34 The consequences
of a states' right approach, however, go much farther than these,
and much beyond the abolition of an individual right to keep and
bear arms, as the following discussion makes clear.
B. Present Day Consequences
If, as states' right advocates would have it, the Second
Amendment creates a right of the states to possess a measure of
independent military power, what are the consequences of applying that right in the present day? Our discussion must be
hypothetical, as the Court never has applied the states' right approach in a Second Amendment case, but we will focus on a
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couple of fairly easy cases: state nullification of federal gun laws
and the status of the National Guard as currently constituted.
1. State Militias and Federal Gun Laws
As we have already seen, the states' right interpretation of
the Second Amendment means that state militias must be sufficiently independent to serve as an effective counterweight to the
federal standing army. Among other things, this requirement
means that state militias must be large. Although there has been
much romanticism about the effectiveness of part-time citizen
soldiers, the Framers did not labor under the belief that an armed
citizenry was a one-to-one match for professional soldiers. Their
own Revolutionary War experience clarified this fact, which is
why their discussion of the militia's usefulness tended to emphasize its size. 35 Unfortunately, outfitting a large force is
expensive, and many states are poor-especially by comparison
to the federal government. Expense was precisely the problem
faced by the early Congress when it passed the Militia Act of
"1792.36 That act established a "Uniform Militia throughout the
United States, 37 consisting of every able-bodied male citizen
between the ages of eighteen and forty-five and provided:
That every citizen so enrolled and notified, shall,
within six months thereafter, provide himself with a
good musket or firelock, sufficient bayonet and belt, two
spare flints, and a knapsack, a pouch with a box therein
to contain not less than twenty-four cartridges, suited to
the bore of his musket or firelock, each cartridge to
contain a proper quantity of powder and ball: or with a
good rifle, knapsack, shot-pouch and powder-horn,
twenty balls suited to the bore of his rifle, and a quarter
of a pound of powder; and shall appear, so armed, accoutered and provided, when called out to exercise, or
into service, except, that when called out on company
days to exercise only, he may appear without a knapsack.38
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One well might imagine a state choosing to equip its militia
in the same fashion: rather than purchasing the equipment and
distributing it to citizens, it simply might require citizens to possess the requisite arms, ammunition, clothing, etc. and keep them
in readiness. It is easy to imagine why a state might want to impose such requirements, not only for the cost savings (likely the
main motivation), but also recognizing the advantage that when
the militia is called out, its members will be already familiar
with their weapons and will not need to proceed to an armory or
other facility to receive weapons and supplies. Such convenience
could be very useful in the kinds of major emergenciesearthquakes, hurricanes, riots, and military coups-for which the
In fact, some
militia is intended when travel might be disrupted.
39
state militia laws contain such provisions.
Under a states' right view, such an approach raises potential
conflicts with federal legislation. For example, what if a state
were to require its militia- eligible citizens to be equipped with
"assault rifles" -that is, semiautomatic rifles of military styling
(perhaps derived from military designs) and equipped with
military-type features such as bayonet lugs, flash suppressers,
folding stocks, bipods, or large-capacity magazines? Or, for that
matter, what if a state were to require actual military weapons
capable of fully automatic fire? (After all, countries like Switzerland and Israel do this as a matter of course.) 4° Such weapons
normally cannot be possessed by individuals without running
afoul of various federal firearms laws.4'
Yet the states' rights approach would make such federal
laws unconstitutional as applied to the members of state militias,
so long as the state required, or permitted, them to keep such
weapons at hand. Because the purpose of the Second Amendment is, according to the states' right interpretation, to protect
the independence of state militias vis-A-vis the federal government, allowing the federal government to fully or partially
disarm state militias would frustrate the core purpose of the
amendment. Thus, most federal firearms laws would not be applicable to citizens covered by state militia laws-though no
13
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doubt the federal government would retain the power to outlaw
weapons obviously unsuited for militia use such as42derringers,
wallet-guns, umbrella-guns, and sawed-off shotguns.
Furthermore, because the militia is conceived as a large
body of citizens (which it must be if it is to counter the federal
standing army) federal gun control laws could, in effect, be nullified by state legislation that requires militia members to
possess banned weapons-legislation that might well reach a
majority of the state's population. Some citizens would not
benefit from such an action, 43 but the loophole thus opened in
federal gun control laws would be large enough through which
to march an army-or at least a militia. Under a states' right interpretation, the states themselves would be free to regulate, or
even entirely forbid, gun ownership, subject only to general constitutional 44guarantees, such as due process and equal

protection.

But this result would not be achieved without cost: Federal
power to restrict firearms ownership necessarily would be concomitantly limited. By long-established tradition, states do not
arm civilians they call upon for armed service: Militiamen, civilian volunteers, and persons called for service in the posse
comitatus are expected to provide their own arms.45 At the same
time, however, the great majority of states allow law-abiding, responsible adults to possess a wide variety of firearms under
extensive regulation, 46 while felons and juveniles, for example,
generally are forbidden firearms. 47 Given the tradition of extensive firearms regulation and of a self-armed militia, a state's
failure to outlaw general possession of particular kinds of weapons could be deemed to reflect an affirmative judgment that such
possession serves a policy of maintaining an armed citizenry as
the state's ultimate military reserve.48 If so construed, a state's
mere failure to outlaw certain arms would preempt the application in that state of any federal law banning those arms. Such a
"negative pregnant" application of state gun laws would give
suitable deference to the imperative for state control over militia
arms, which is basic to the view that the Second Amendment
confers a states' right.
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If the courts accepted a negative pregnant application of
state gun laws, it would, as a matter of constitutional law, confine federal gun legislation to the limited role to which it
traditionally has been confined as a matter of policyreinforcing state gun laws by prohibiting the movement of firearms in interstate commerce from those states in which they are
legal to states in which they are prohibited. 49 This result would
have many interesting implications, not the least of which would
be its effect on the long-standing (and surprisingly large) American market for denatured World War II fighter planes and Soviet
jet fighters, which are currently available at prices as low as
$50,000. 50 In the many states whose laws allow machine gun
ownership, the "recreational fighter pilots" who flock to buy
these denatured aircraft could re-equip them with machine guns
and automatic cannon for service in the unorganized militia.
Although seemingly farfetched, this result is a natural consequence of the states' right approach, though not, as will be
discussed, of the individual right approach. 5'
Nor is this prospect illusory even if the negative pregnant
interpretation of state gun law patterns is rejected. In addition to
the states that simply do not outlaw machine guns, other states
license appropriate applicants, such as security company operators, to possess them. 2 Such laws are currently thought to be
preempted by federal legislation. 3 Under the states' right view
of the Second Amendment, however, such affirmative permission could be construed as preempting application to those
licensees of the federal law prohibiting civilian purchases of
machine guns manufactured after May 19, 1 9 860M
It bears emphasis that the issues raised in the last two paragraphs involve only the particular means by which state
preemption of federal gun laws would operate. That such preemption would operate cannot be doubted under the states' right
approach because it is inherent in that view. Certainly, any state
could preempt the operation of any contrary federal gun law
within its borders by enacting laws affirmatively authorizing the
military-age citizenry of the state to arm themselves with any
kind of weaponry specified, including machine guns, bazookas,
15
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fighter planes, armored personnel carriers, tanks, PT- boats, and
other armed ships. 5 Without such preemptive power, the "right"
of the states under the states' right theory would be illusory.
Moreover, under the states' right view, the Second Amendment guarantees a vastly greater range of weaponry (to stateauthorized civilians or to the states themselves) than is implied
by the individual right view. Exponents of the latter view have
been at some pains to show that the Amendment extends to
small arms only. Warships, tanks, artillery, missiles, atomic
bombs, and so forth are excluded from its guarantee for several
reasons, including the Amendment's text, 56 the history of the
common law right to arms, and the logic of the individual right
position.58
Of course, none of the limitations implicit in the individual
right view applies to the states' right view because the common
law imposed no limitations on the kinds of arms the government
might possess. If the incongruity of the Amendment describing a
state as "bearing" arms can be ignored, which the states' right
view necessarily does, a state is obviously no more incapable of
"bearing" cannon than any other kind of arms. Moreover, if the
purpose of the Second Amendment is to guarantee the existence
of state military forces that can serve as "a military counterpoint
to the regular standing army, 59 the arms it guarantees the states
logically could include even the most destructive implements of
modem war. However unsettling these results may be, they inevitably result from the Antifederalist critique of the original
Constitution upon which proponents of the states' right view
rely.
Although itisdoubtful that Mr.Henigan and other enthusiasts of the states' right approach desire this result, it seems an
unavoidable consequence of arguing that the Second Amendment protects the right of states to maintain militias. One might
attempt to avoid this consequence by arguing that the only militia covered by the Second Amendment is the National Guard,
but, as demonstrated below, the consequences of that approach
are also rather radical.
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2. The National Guard and the Second Amendment
If the Second Amendment serves to protect the independence of state militias, or as former Chief Justice Burger calls
them, "state armies," 6 can the National Guard as currently constituted withstand Second Amendment scrutiny? Although the
Supreme Court has never addressed this issue, the answer appears to be no because, as the Supreme
Court has held, the
6
National Guard is not at all independent. '
Originally, the militia was organized as the entire ablebodied male citizenry between eighteen and forty-five years of
age, self-equipped, and required to turn out regularly (usually
once per year) to demonstrate that it was properly equipped and
armed. 62 Unfortunately, the militia was not adequate to the needs
of an expanding nation with territorial ambitions outside its borders. There were repeated incidents in which the militia refused
to invade Canada, Mexico, and various other locations, or in
which federal attempts to so employ the militia were held illegal. 63 This produced a series of "reforms" that created a force far
more effective on the battlefield and, more importantly, far better suited to employment in wars abroad. 64
However, in the process of transforming the traditional militia into the modern-day National Guard, these reforms
transformed the National Guard into a federal, rather than state,
65
institution.
Under the current system, National Guard officers have dual
status: They are members of both the State Guard and the federal
armed forces.66 They are armed, paid, and trained by the federal
government. 67 They can be called out at will by the federal government, and such call-outs cannot be resisted, in any
meaningful fashion, by their states. 68 They are subject to federal
military discipline on the same basis as members of the national
government's armed forces.69 And they are required to swear an
oath of loyalty to the United States government, as well as to
their states.70
This de facto federal control makes it difficult to argue that
the National Guard is capable of carrying out the militia's role,
17
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central to the states' right interpretation, of serving as a counterweight to the power of the federal standing army. As one military officer states:
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By providing for a militia in the Constitution, the
Framers sought to strengthen civilian control of the
military. They postulated that a militia composed of citizen-soldiers would curb any unseemly ambitions of the
small standing army. Today's National Guard is often
perceived as the successor to the militia, and observers
still tout the Guard's role as the ultimate restraint on the
professional military. The reality, however, is much different. Today's National Guard is a very different force
from the colonial-era militia. With 178,000 full-time
federal employees and almost all of its budget drawn
from the federal government, the National Guard is, for
all practical purposes, a federal force. Indeed, one commentator concluded that it is very much akin to the
"standing army" against which the Founding Fathers
railed.7 '
If the National Guard is organized in a way that makes it inconsistent with the role that the Second Amendment envisionsand, under the states' right view, mandates-for the militia,
there are only two possibilities. One is that the National Guard is
not the militia to which the Second Amendment refers; the other
is that the National Guard is that militia, but that its current configuration, however well-suited to support foreign military
ventures, is unconstitutional because it is inconsistent with the
Second Amendment.
The existing case law suggests the former answer. In Perpich
v. Department of Defense,72 the Supreme Court addressed the
question of what limitations are imposed on the National Guard
under the militia clauses. The question before the Court was
whether state governors could prevent their National Guard units
from being sent abroad for highly controversial training missions
in Central America. 73 In short, the Court concluded that Congress's powers to raise armies and make war, rather than its
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militia powers, were
While not dispositive on the
Second Amendment issue (perhaps significantly, the Court did
not discuss the Second Amendment at all) this case suggests that
the National Guard should be viewed constitutionally as it really
is-a fundamentally federal force with a (very) thin patina of
state control rather than the "well-regulated militia" that the
Second Amendment deems "necessary to the security of a free
75
State.
That militia must be found elsewhere-and it is. Although
the National Guard may have its roots in the classical militia, it
clearly has been transformed into something else entirely-a
federal institution with only tenuous ties to the states. However,
the National Guard is not the last word in militias, even today.
While the National Guard may be an organized militia 76 (what
the Framers would have called a "select" militia)77 there exists,
both at the federal and state level, a militia of the sort that the
Framers intended. Federal law continues to recognize an unorganized militia composed of males age eighteen to forty- five,78
as do the laws of most states,79 except that many now include
80
women.
Under the states' right theory, the existence of state militias
of this kind would have to be protected against federal interfer8
ence by the Second Amendment--even, as mentioned above, 1
to the extent of nullifying federal firearms laws. It is not clear
whether the Second Amendment would create an affirmative
duty on the part of the states to maintain state militias. However,
if the state role is as important as the states' right interpretation
insists, such a duty is at least plausible. With regard to most
states, however, state constitutional provisions probably create
82
such a duty anyway.
Regardless, states clearly do not serve the ends of the Second Amendment by maintaining a National Guard. Rather, they
serve the ends (however admirable) of the national government.
HI. The States' Right View Of State-Federal Relations
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Under the classical view of the Constitution, authority is
delegated by the people to two kinds of governments, state and
federal. State governments are not creations of the federal government, nor is the federal government the creature of the states.
Both exercise authority delegated to them by the true sovereigns,
the people.8 3 The real question in assessing any governmental
action is whether that action is consistent with the authority
delegated by the people,
or whether it exceeds that authority and
84
is thus ultra vires.
But there is another view. In this view, the state governments represent the "real" governments of the people. The
federal government exists as a somewhat mistrusted agent of the
states, with states retaining the power to protect their people by
checking the actions of the federal government when necessary
to prevent overreaching. This view seems to be that embodied by
the states' right interpretation, in which state organizations are
set against the federal government and in which state legislators
retain the power to nullify federal firearms laws that would otherwise frustrate state prerogatives. 85
If applied across the board, this view would have rather
dramatic consequences, going far beyond those outlined above.
States' rights, and a view of state governments as interposed
between the federal government and their citizens, after all,
formed the core of the losing argument in Brown v. Board of
867
Education6---and, for
that matter, of the Civil War. Yet if we
are to decide that the Second Amendment embodies this general
theory of the relations between the state and federal governments, there seems no reason to assume that the Framers had
different intentions elsewhere in the same Constitution. Thus,
unless we are to be entirely incoherent, we must seriously consider rethinking constitutional history all the way back to Brown
and, indeed, to McCulloch v. Maryland. Yet it seems unlikely
that we will be willing to go that far. The view of states as the
primary constituents of our Constitution, although it has an ancient (if not always honorable) history, is not one that enjoys
great esteem or adherence today given the past circumstances of
its invocation.
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Nor is it particularly consistent with either the language or
the history of the Constitution. The Preamble, after all, states
that the Constitution was ordained and established by "We the
People," not "We the States." 88 And the Constitution was ratified by special conventions of the people, not by state
legislatures. 89 So there seems to be good reason to label the
states' right theory "Can of Worms" and set it on the shelf. Under the individual right view, on the other hand, the Second
Amendment is seen as protecting precisely what its language describes: a "right of the people,"" with the militia seen as an
organization of the people-regulated to some degree by the
state, but there to serve the interests not of the state (or the
States) but of the people. This view, unlike the states' right
view, is consistent with both the text of the Second Amendment
and the interpretive approach taken with regard to the rest of the
Constitution. It also avoids the kind of state-federal confrontations that the states' right approach seems likely--and even
intended-to create.
The only problem with the individual right approach is that
it requires precisely what advocates of the states' right approach
wish to deny: an individual right to keep and bear arms. But
criticism of a constitutional provision on the basis that it grants
people rights that one does not like--though an approach also
possessed of a long, if not distinguished, history-is not very
persuasive. The purpose of the Constitution, after all, and especially of the Bill of Rights, is not to make it easy for us to do
what we want. For those unhappy with the notion of an individual right to arms, the solution is to amend the Constitution
through the procedures set out in Article V, not to amend the
Constitution through specious interpretive schemes. 9'
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Our thought experiment has thus produced two noteworthy
results. The first is the realization that the states' right interpretation of the Second Amendment, if taken seriously, would
produce rather radical consequences--consequences that
(perhaps deliberately) have not been discussed by its proponents.
In light of those radical consequences, and the interpretation's
general inconsistency with the rest of the Constitutional scheme,
the states' right theory looks like a dud.92 What is amazing is
that it has achieved such currency, at least in the popular constitutional debate.
And that is the second lesson. Although the states' right interpretation has obtained very little in the way of scholarly
support in journals that require footnotes, 93 it has been widely
circulated in the popular press, even by respectable scholars who
should (and, one suspects, do) know better. 94 And this suggests a
rather unfortunate fact: the constitutional currency has become
rather debased. In the Reagan era, right-wing scholars and
spokespeople were trying to narrow constitutional rights through
specious interpretations. Now, with political power having
shifted, the disease has spread to those on the left. Meeseism, it
would seem, respects no ideological bounds.
This state of affairs is unfortunate, and for those of us who
at least try to take the Constitution seriously, it is frustrating.
And, because the Constitution is our blueprint for living together
without killing or tyrannizing each other, it may even be dangerous. Interpreting the Constitution faithfully is hard work and is
certain to generate some answers that the interpreter does not
like-at least, it is certain to do so if the interpreter is being
honest. 95 We thus should be suspicious of those whose theories
generate only results that they like, whatever their ideological
96
stripe.
Although it is certainly true that constitutional interpretation
is an inexact science, and that there may be a wide range of
"right" answers to constitutional questions, it is also true that
some answers are better than others: more in accord with principles of craft, more consistent with the constitutional scheme, or
better grounded in history.97 By this standard, the states' right
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argument fails. But by the more modem standard, of newspaper
advertisements and political talking-head shows, that matters
little. It may well be that there is a "Gresham's Law" of pop
constitutionalism, with the bad scholarship (if that is the word)
driving out the good.
The solution to this problem is beyond the scope of this Article, which has merely served to illustrate its existence in one
particular context. But having already made use of the "thought
experiment" technique, perhaps we could take another lesson
from the world of scientists, where publication of research is
seen as a test of its authors' seriousness. Instead of allowing law
professors to opine freely based on some general sense of their
expertise, perhaps we should challenge them by asking if their
views are supported by published articles-their own, or other
people's. This rather minimal requirement, that arguments be set
out in writing and supported by research, would nonetheless
provide a substantial amount of discipline to the world of talking-head constitutionalism. It also would ensure to some degree
that those who make constitutional arguments in the public arena
have spent some time thinking them through first. That too, to
judge from current circumstances, would be a step forward.
Until the happy day arrives when this proposal is adopted,
we can at least criticize talking-head constitutionalism in the law
reviews, with the hope that such criticism will percolate back
into the general society. (Such criticism, after all, is a major reason for having law reviews.) The Constitution, and especially
the Bill of Rights, is a package deal: It is all or nothing, and for
each of us there are likely to be parts we dislike. Where such
parts exist, the answer is either to live with them or to amend the
Constitution, not to interpret pieces of it out of existence. There
always will be a market for those who feel otherwise just as
there always will be a market for "miracle" diets that purport to
let people eat all they want and not exercise. But the Constitution, unlike the diet industry or the mass media, is not founded
on giving the people what they want. We forget that at our peril,
and as the mass-marketing of the states' right interpretation of
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the Second Amendment demonstrates, we appear perilously
close to forgetting it now.
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Second Amendment guarantees a personal right to bear arms under a republican interpretation).
4. "When James Madison and his colleagues drafted the Bill of Rights, they
firmly believed in two distinct principles: (1) Individuals had the right to possess arms to defend themselves and their property; and (2) states retained the
right to maintain militias composed of these individually-armed citizens."
Shalhope, supra note 3, at 133.
5. Kates, Self-Protection, supra note 3, at 89; see JOYCE L. MALCOLM, TO
KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN
RIGHT 162 (1994).
The Second Amendment was meant to accomplish two distinct goals First, it
was meant to guarantee the individual's right to have arms for self-defense and
self-preservation. These privately owned arms were meant to serve a larger
purpose [defense of public liberties] as well. [I]t is the coupling of these two
objectives that has caused the most confusion.
IfL
6. See Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the
Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 5 (1989); Dennis A. Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 107 (1991); Warren Spannaus, State Firearms
Regulation and the Second Amendment, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 383 (1983).
7. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 639
(1943) (First Amendment rights "are susceptible of restriction only to prevent
grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect."); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (permitting prior restraint
only in exceptional circumstances akin to "publication of the sailing dates of
transports or the number and location of troops").
8. A further point that is likely to be of more import to enforcement of the Second Amendment than other rights, is that the compelling interest must not be of
a kind, or pursued in a manner, that is fundamentally inconsistent with the
right. This point is so clear in relation to other rights that it is rarely necessary
to emphasize. No matter how compelling the interests in suppressing rape,
child abuse, adultery, homophobic violence, or even genocide, those interests
may not be pursued by banning writings or movies on the ground that they
promote beliefs or ideas that cause such behavior for "the First Amendment's
basic guarantee is of freedom to advocate ideas." Kingsley Int'l Pictures v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959); see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct.
2538, 2542-44 (1992) (speech or expressive conduct cannot be proscribed because of disapproval of the ideas expressed); American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc.
v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327-32 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd without opinion, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986). "Under the First Amendment the government must leave to
the people the evaluation of ideas." ld at 327.

Journalo~n Firearms

Volume Eioht

Concomitantly, within the individual right view of the Second Amendment, a
law barring visitors to prison inmates from carrying weapons may well be justified as representing an interest that is at once compelling and not
fundamentally inconsistent. That could not be said of banning all guns (or any
guns) under the rationales commonly offered. Examples of such rationales include the assertion "that lethal violence even in self-defense only engenders
more lethal violence and that gun control should override any personal need for
safety," HEALTH, Mar./Apr. 1994, at 54 (quoting Betty Friedan), that "the
only reason for guns in civilian hands is for sporting purposes," David B. Kopel, Assault Ban Chicanery, WASH. TIMES, May 5, 1994, at A18 (quoting
Sarah Brady, Chairperson, Handgun Control, Inc.), and that self-defense is an
atavistic usurpation of the prerogatives of the state, RAMSEY CLARK,
CRIME IN AMERICA 106-07 (1970).
9. See, e.g., Dwight L. Greene, Justice Scalia and Tonto: Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance, and the Myth of Colorless Individualism in Bostick v. Florida, 67
TUL. L. REV. 1979, 2044 (1993).
10. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. Indeed, a reading of the Constitution will
demonstrate that grants of governmental authority are generally described as
"powers." See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § I (describing "legislative Powers");
U.S. CONST. art. II, § I ("executive power"); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1
("judicial Power").
11. E.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974).
12. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
13. See sources cited supra note 6.
14. Henigan is Director of the Legal'Action Project at the Center to Prevent
Handgun Violence in Washington, D.C.
15. Henigan, supra note 6, at 119.
16. Id at 120.
17. Id. at 121 (citations omitted).
18. Henigan is the author of two law review articles that adopt this approach.
See supra note 6. The late Chief Justice Warren Burger also made this argument, although not in a scholarly publication. See Press Conference
Concerning Introduction of the Public Health and Safety Act of 1992, June 26,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ARCNWS File.
[O]ne of the frauds-and I use that term advisedly-on the American people
has been the campaign to mislead the public about the Second Amendment.
The Second Amendment doesn't guarantee the right to have firearms at all.
[The Framers] wanted the Bill of Rights to make sure that there was no standing army in this country, but that there would be state armies. Every state
during the revolution had its own army. There was no national army.
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Id. (statement of Warren Burger). At any rate, taking Henigan as representative
of his school of thought is unlikely to work any substantial unfairness, as Henigan himself makes similar use of an article by Professor Sanford Levinson. See
Henigan, supra note 6, at 110.
19. See, e.g., MALCOLM, supra note 5, at 146; 2 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
646 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1891); THE FEDERALIST NO. 8, at 67
(Alexander Hamilton) (Willmore Kendall & George W. Carey eds., 1966);
THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 57 (Cecilia M. Kenyon ed., 1966).
20. See Kates, Self-Protection, supra note 3.
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
24. In fact, when the Army wanted to use militia units to chase Mexican bandits south of the border, Attorney General Wickersham opined that this clause
prohibited the use of militia units outside American borders. 29 Op. Att'y Gen.
322 (1912). Nor are fears that such a call-up might destroy the independenceor even the existence-of a state militia unfounded; they have some historical
basis. As the Supreme Court noted in Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496
U.S. 334 (1990), "[t]he draft of the individual members of the National Guard
into the Army during World War I virtually destroyed the Guard as an effective
organization." Id. at 345. Obviously, militia call-ups might have the same effect.
25. Henigan, supra note 6, at 118-20.
26. See supra notes 15-18; see also Henigan, supra note 6, at 116-17.
The Bill of Rights was the outgrowth of the Antifederalist critique. One consistent Antifederalist theme was that the Constitution had created an
excessively powerful central authority, which would lead to the destruction of
the states. For example, the Antifederalists feared that the Militia Clauses of the
Constitution had given the central government excessive control over the state
militia, which was regarded as the guardian of the states' integrity The Virginia
debate is replete with expressions of fear that federal control over the militias
would destroy them.
Id.
27. Of course, a requirement that such forces be commanded by federal officers, rather than officers appointed by the states, would not only raise Second
Amendment concerns but also would violate the specific language of Article I,
section 8, clause 16 reserving the appointment of militia officers to the states.
28. Compare Malcolm, supra note 5, at 4 ("The militia was first and foremost a
defensive force and could not be taken out of the realm. Members were even
reluctant to leave their own counties.") with id. at 23 ("With the Commonwealth threatened by internal insurrection and foreign invasion [after the
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English Civil War] the new rulers had ample excuse to maintain a large standing army. And the country that had always depended upon an impromptu
militia found itself supporting a standing army respected and feared throughout
Europe."); see also THE FEDERALIST NOS. 8, 19, 20, supra note 19, at 6768, 131, 135 (using the word "troops" to refer to members of a professional
standing army, as opposed to the militia, which is made up of citizen-soldiers).
Note, however, that this interpretation does not dispose of the question of
"ships of war," which the states presumably would remain free to keep, or of
the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal, also prohibited by Article 1,section 10.
29. This discussion raises another crucial difference between the states' right
and individual right views. The latter clearly distinguishes the "militia," as that
term is used in the Second Amendment, from "troops." The individual right
view rests on the 18th-century meaning of "militia"-not a formal military unit
but a system that required each household and virtually every military-age male
to own arms and mandated the appearance of military-age males for training or
service when called to do so. See Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 3, at
214-18. But in the states' right view, "militia" refers to a formal military unita body of troops serving the state. Indeed, it is an item of faith among partisans
of that view that today the "militia" means the National Guard. As discussed, if
by "militia" the Amendment means a formal military body, and if the Amendment should be read as a guarantee of state power to arm such a body, the
Article I, section 10, clause 3 prohibition on states keeping "troops" without
the consent of-Congress seems vulnerable. Id. These problems are inescapable
in the context of a states' right approach, unless we entirely ignore the text of
the Constitution and the Second Amendment.
30. See MALCOLM, supra note 5, at 155-59; Henigan, supra note 6, at 11617.
31. MALCOLM, supra note 5, at 155-59.
32. Id.; see STEVEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED:
THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 65-66 (1984); David
T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559, 598 (1986).
33. MALCOLM, supra note 5, at 159 (emphasis added). For Madison's long
record of support for stronger federal military powers, see RUSSELL F.
WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 79,88 (1967).
Significantly, Madison's own proposal for integrating the Bill of Rights into
the Constitution was not to add them at the end (as they have been) but to interlineate them into the portions of the original Constitution they affected or to
which they related. If he had thought the Second Amendment would alter the
military or militia provisions of the Constitution he would have interlineated it
in Article I, section 8, near or after clauses 15 and 16. Instead, he planned to
insert the right to arms with freedom of religion, the press and other personal
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rights in § 9 following the rights against bills of attainder and ex post facto
laws.
Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 3, at 223.
34. "Of course, it must be acknowledged that the Second Amendment did effect
some change in the Constitutional scheme; presumably the Framers did not
adopt the Bill of Rights in 1791 with the intent to leave things as they were in
1787." Henigan, supra note 6, at 116.
35. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, at 184-85 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Willmore Kendall & George W. Carey eds., 1966).
Little more can reasonably be aimed at with respect to the people at large than
to have them properly armed and equipped. This will not only lessen the call
for military establishments, but if circumstances should at any time oblige the
government to form an army of any magnitude that army can never be formidable to the liberties of the people while there is a large body of citizens, little if
at all inferior to them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready to defend their rights and those of their fellow citizens.
Id. Likewise, in THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, Madison notes that a regular
army that threatened liberty would find itself opposed by "a militia amounting
to near a half a million citizens with arms in their hands." Id. at 299.
36. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (1792).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 3, at 249.
40. See SWITZ. CONST. art. 18 ("All members of the armed forces shall be
given their first arms, equipment and clothing free of charge. The soldiers shall
keep their personal arms under the conditions federal legislation shall determine."); ZE'EV SCHIFF, A HISTORY OF THE ISRAELI ARMY 50 (1985);
Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 3, at 249 n.193. Indeed, the Swiss go so
far as to allow private ownership of everything from howitzers to anti-aircraft
guns and missiles. See DAVID KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE,
AND THE COWBOY: SHOULD AMERICA ADOPT THE GUN
CONTROLS OF OTHER DEMOCRACIES? 283,292, 295 (1992).
41. 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (1988) governs the sale, transportation, or possession of
"destructive devices," defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(4) (1988), as including
rockets, bombs, and grenades. 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1988), prohibits civilian
purchase of fully automatic weapons, except for those manufactured prior to
May 19, 1986. As to the permitted, pre-1986 firearms, purchase is subject to
registration requirements and a $200 transaction fee. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5811, 5812.
Under the states' right view, this tax likely could not be applied to prohibit the
purchase of fully automatic firearms by persons whom a state has licensed to
possess them.
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42. Cf. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (discussing suitability
of sawed-off shotguns for militia use).
43. For example, infants and the elderly, as well as criminals and the insane,
would not benefit from nullification. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
44. See Springfield Armory, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 29 F.3d 250 (6th Cir.
1994) (finding the definition of "assault weapon" to be unconstitutionally

vague).
45. Compare Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 3, at 271-72 (discussing
various state militia forces during World War II) and William 0. Treacy,
Maryland Minute Men, 6 GLADES STAR 214 (1988) (same) with United
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939) ("[W]hen called for [militia] service
[militia] men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and
of the kind in common use at the time.").
46. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12000-12809 (West 1992). A generally
accepted estimate is that as of 1980 there were about 20,000 firearms laws of
one sort or another already on the books. JAMES D. WRIGHT ET AL.,
UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA
244 (1983). For a survey of current federal gun laws, see United States v.
Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994);
GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA
323-58 (1991).
47. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12100-01, 12021 (West 1992).
48. In fact, the "unorganized militia" constitutes the ultimate military reserve
resource of both federal and state governments for call-up in dire emergency;
for example, in case earthquake, flood, other natural disaster, or riot overwhelms police in circumstances in which the National Guard and Army are
overseas or otherwise unavailable, perhaps because of transportation disruption. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 311 (1988); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE §§ 121,
122 (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-8-107, 28-3-102, -103(6) & (8),
-104 (1989) (classifying the male population aged 18 to 45 as the unorganized
militia of, respectively, the United States, California, and Colorado, subject to
call at the command of designated public officers).
49. See Lopez, 3 F.3d at 1348-59 (providing a history of federal firearms laws).
50. For more on this unusual market sector, see Gavin Cordan, The Private Pilots with Jet Warplanes, Press Assoc. Newsfile, Apr. 5, 1994, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File (describing growth of private market for
military jets); Neal Gendler, An Air Affair, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St.
Paul), June 26, 1994, at IG (describing privately owned fighters including
MiG- 15s, F-86 Sabres, Saab Drakens, and even a privately owned B-57 Canberra jet bomber); Dave Hirschman, Three Area Pilots Upsize in Jet from
British Military, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis), June 5, 1994, at IC
(reporting the existence of over 200 privately owned fighter jets in the United
States, with MiG- 17 and F- 86 Sabre jets selling for $50,000 or less).
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51. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-209 (Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 12230 (West 1992); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 379 (1992).
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 927 (1988).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1988) (limiting civilian purchase of fully automatic
weapons to those manufactured prior to May 19, 1986, subject to registration
requirements under 26 U.S.C. § 5812 (1988), and to a $200 transaction fee under 26 U.S.C. § 5811 (1988)). Under the states' right view of the Second
Amendment it is arguable that this prohibitory $200 fee probably could not be
applied to purchases of fully automatic firearms by persons whom a state has
licensed to possess them.
55. The sale, transportation, or possession of "destructive devices," defined in
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(4) (1988), as rockets, bombs, grenades missiles, and mines,
is governed by 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (1988).
A further interesting question is whether localities, which are legally agencies of the state, could engage in such preemptive activity. If so, the several
localities that have enacted resolutions purporting to nullify all, or most, federal
gun laws by creating local militias have been doing more than simply expressing their anger. See, e.g., Mike Tharp, The Rise of Citizen Militias, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 15, 1994, at 34 (describing efforts at organizing
previously dormant militia organizations).
Some sort of government sponsorship, however, is crucial to the legitimacy
of a militia, whether or not such membership has anything to do with Second
Amendment rights. Although the militia was conceived as external to the state
in the sense of being an institution of the people, the expectation was that the
state, not private groups, would provide the foundation upon which the structure of the militia would be erected. This dual character is difficult for many
modem Americans, with more European-influenced ideas of the state and its
institutions, to appreciate. But perhaps the best analogy would be to the institution of the jury. The jury was traditionally intended not just as a protection
for individuals, but far more importantly as a check against overweening state
power, since it could always refuse to convict in cases of political prosecution.
And, like the militia, the jury was intended to reflect the community, and to
function in many ways independent of state direction. But the state provides the
structure within which the jury operates: no one can get together with eleven
friends and proclaim themselves a jury.
Similarly, although First Amendment associational rights may provide some
protection for individuals who band together and call themselves a "militia,"
they do not thereby become the well-regulated militia that the Second Amendment describes, nor do they acquire any additional Second Amendment rights
by virtue of doing so. As David Williams explains, "[R]epublicans did not intend to leave the universality of the militia to the chance decision of every
citizen to arm herself. The state was supposed to erect the necessary scaffolding
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on which the militia could build itself, to muster the militia, and to oblige every
citizen to own a gun." Williams, supra note 3, at 593.
One might argue that the state and federal governments have defaulted on
this obligation, but that does not create additional rights for groups formed
without government sponsorship.
There are similar problems with militia theorists' invocation of the right of
revolt. While the Framers certainly believed in such a right, they also developed a rather exacting test for when it properly might be exercised, a test that
many theorists of discontent do not address.
In short, as Williams summarizes: This right of resistance is the second result of entrusting force to the militia. It is the only purpose of the Second
Amendment explicitly mentioned during its discussion in Congress Republicans were aware of the danger implicit in vouchsafing this right of resistance in
the citizenry and sensitive to the charge that they were inciting violence. They
developed a number of limits on the right: It must be a product of the "body" of
the people, i.e., the great majority acting by consensus; it must be a course of
last resort; its inspiration must be a commitment to the common good; and its
object must be a true tyrant, committed to large-scale abuse, not merely randomly unjust or sinful in private life. An uprising that failed to meet these
criteria was considered an illegitimate rebellion, rather than an act of true republican resistance. Id. at 582.
The failure until recently of the academic community to take the Second
Amendment seriously, a topic discussed in more detail later on in this essay,
may in part be responsible for many of these misunderstandings. The consequences of such confusion may be serious: Constitutional theory matters, not
just in the academic world, but in the real world as well. For a considerably
more detailed treatment of these issues see Glenn H. Reynolds, A Critical
Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461 (1995); Glenn H.
Reynolds, Up in Arms About a Revolting Movement, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30,
1995, at 11 [hereinafter Reynolds, Up in Arms].
56. Implicit in an individual's "right to keep and bear arms" is a limitation on
the kinds of arms an individual can possess; that is, they include only weapons
that can be picked up. See Kates, supra note 3, at 261.
57. See David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiography of the
Bill of Rights, 4 J.L. & POL. 1,29 (1987).
58. The individual right view sees the Second Amendment as expressing the
Founders' belief that the right to arms is implicit in the cardinal natural right of
self-defense. Kates, Self-Protection, supra note 3, at 89-103. The basic arms
with which one might defend home and family were, and are, the same ordinary
civilian small arms with which one would render militia service. In contrast,
cannons and warships are not the kinds of arms with which one would repel
burglars and rapists, they are not the kinds of weapons one can "bear," nor do
they conform to the history of the common law right the Amendment incorporates. See David I. Caplan, The Right of the Individual To Bear Arms: A
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Recent Judicial Trend, 1982 DET. C.L. REV. 789, 804-11; Halbrook, supra
note 3, at 157-60; Kates, A Dialogue, supra note 3, at 146-48; Kates, Original
Meaning, supra note 3, at 259.
59. Henigan, supra note 6, at 119; see text accompanying supra note 15.
60. See supra note 18.
61. Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 351 (1989).
62. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 24. For a litany of complaints about the militia's unsuitability in providing the kind of "global reach" needed by a nascent superpower, see
Frederick B. Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARV. L.
REV. 181, 189-93 (1940).
64. See Peter A. Fish, Note, The Constitution and the Training of National
Guardsmen: Can State Governors Prevent Uncle Sam from Sending the Guard
to Central America?, 4 J.L. & POL. 597, 605-10 (1988).
65. See id. at 612.
66. 10 U.S.C. § 311 (1988).
67. 10 U.S.C. § 101(10)(C) (1988).
68. 10 U.S.C. § 332 (1988); see also infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text
(discussing Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990)).
69. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(3) (1988).
70. See 32 U.S.C. § 304 (1988) (National Guardsmen's oath); 10 U S.C. §
3261 (a)(2) (1988) (requiring members of the Guard to take the oath).
71. Col. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian
Control of the U.S. Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 384-85 (1994)
(citing William S. Fields & David T. Hardy, The Militia and the Constitution:
A Legal History, 136 MIL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992)).
72. 496 U.S. 334 (1990).
73. Id. at 336-38.
74. Id. at 349-51.
75. Indeed, the Court was explicit on this point:
The Governor argues that this interpretation of the Militia Clauses has the
practical effect of nullifying an important state power that is expressly reserved
in the Constitution. We disagree. It merely recognizes the supremacy of federal
power in the area of military affairs. The Federal Government provides virtually all of the funding, the material, and the leadership for the State Guard
units.
Id. at 351 (footnotes omitted).
76. Some commentators have suggested that the National Guard should be considered "troops" raised with consent of Congress, under Article I, section 10,
rather than a militia of any sort. See, e.g., Fields & Hardy, supra note 7 1.
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See, e.g., Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 3, at 216-17; Malcolm, supra
note 5, at 142, 156. Note also the following:
Nowadays, it is quite common to speak loosely of the National Guard as "the
state militia," but 200 years ago, any band of paid, semiprofessional, part-time
volunteers, like today's Guard, would have been called "a select corps" or
"select militia"-and viewed in many quarters as little better than a standing
army. In 1789, when used without any qualifying adjective, "the militia" referred to all Citizens capable of bearing arms. [Thus] the "militia" is identical
to "the people."
Amar, supra note 3, at 1166 (footnotes omitted).
78. 10 U.S.C. § 311 (1988); see also Fields & Hardy, supra note 71, at 42
n.160 (noting that while the United States technically continues to maintain a
national "general" militia, for practical purposes this militia does not play any
significant role in the national defense).
79. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. XVI, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. VI, § 1; KY.
CONST. § 219; N.M. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 16;
OHIO CONST. art. IX, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. XV,
§ 1; UTAH CONST. art. XV, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. 17, § i; ALA. CODE §
31-2-2 to 31-2-5 (1975); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-61-101(b) (Michie 1987);
CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 122 (West 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
27-2 (West 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2-3(d) (1982 & Supp. 1994);
IDAHO CODE § 46-102 (1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-2- 3-1 (Bums 1992);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-904(e) (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 190.06 (West
1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 33-5-1 (1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-2
(Michie 1989); N.Y. MIL. LAWS § 2 (Consol. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. §
396.105(3) (1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 30-1-2 (1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 33-2-2 (1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-1-104(d) (1989); WYO.
STAT. § 19-2-102(a) (1977).
80. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. IX, § 1; CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 554
(West 1988 & Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE § 46-105 (1977); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 48- 904(e) (1983).
81. See supra notes 35-58 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Glenn H. Reynolds, The Right To Keep and Bear Arms Under the
Tennessee Constitution: A Case Study in Civic Republican Thought, 61
TENN. L. REV. 647, 649-50 (1994).
83. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402 (1819); STORY,
supra note 19, at 151, 154, 160. For a more extensive discussion of sovereignty
and federalism issues, see Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96
YALE L.J. 1425 (1987).
84. See, e.g., McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421 (noting that under the
Constitution "the powers of the [federa]l government are limited, and that its
limits are not to be transcended").
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85. One interesting aspect of this view is that it seems inconsistent with the
view of state and federal relations generally held by those favoring gun control
(who are usually, though not always, liberals). As Sanford Levinson has noted,
the debate over the Second Amendment creates a peculiar inversion, with conservatives taking the approach of liberals and vice versa. See Levinson, supra
note 2, at 643-44. Gary Kleck has also commented on this phenomenon, noting
that:
When the issue is gun control, liberals and conservatives switch places. Many
liberals support gun laws that confer broad power on government to regulate
individual behavior, especially in private places, whereas conservatives oppose
them. Some liberals dismiss the Second Amendment to the Constitution as an
outmoded historical curiosity whereas conservatives defend a view of this
amendment that is every bit as broad as the American Civil Liberties Union's
(ACLU) view of the First Amendment
Kleck, supra note 46, at 3-4.
Although a states' right approach to constitutional affairs generally tends to
be identified with reactionary causes, it is identified here with the "progressive"
cause of gun control. (Meanwhile, as Kleck notes, anti-gun control forces wax
eloquent about the importance of individual rights and the dangers of overbearing law enforcement officials-complaints that are conspicuous by their
absence in similar contexts, for example, the drug war. Id. at 4.) The conservative right, however, has almost given up on states' right arguments as a loser,
and the left clings to them only in this one instance, which seems more a case
of constitutional wishful thinking than serious analysis.
86. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
87. See generally DON E. FEHRENBACHER, CONSTITUTIONS AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE SLAVE-HOLDING SOUTH 46-47 (1989)
(describing John Calhoun's theories of state government power to nullify federal legislation, which the South Carolina legislature adopted as official state
doctrine); John C. Calhoun, A Discourse on the Constitution and Government
of the United States, in 1 THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 168-81
(Richard K. Cralle ed., 1851) (reissued 1968) (arguing that our system of governance is by its nature a federal government with the states, and not
individuals, as its constituents).
88. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
89. See U.S. CONST. art. VII (calling for ratification by "Conventions of nine
States"). For a general history of the ratification process, see DANIEL A.
FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 175-218 (1990).
90. U.S. CONST. amend. II. Compare the Second Amendment's use of the
phrase "right of the people" with the use of the same phrase in the First, Fourth,
and Ninth Amendments.
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91. Regarding the right against self-incrimination, the Supreme Court has
stated: "If it be thought that the privilege is outmoded in the conditions of this
modem age, then the thing to do is to [amend] it out of the Constitution, not to
whittle it down by the subtle encroachments of judicial opinion." Ullmann v.
United States, 350 U.S. 422, 427-28 (1956) (quoting Maffie v. United States,
209 F.2d 225, 227 (1st Cir. 1954)).
The other problem with specious interpretive schemes is that the law of
unintended consequences applies with a vengeance where constitutional law is
concerned. Indeed, the modem "militia movement" appears to have arisen primarily as a response to anti-gun arguments that the Second Amendment only
protects militias. See generally Glenn H. Reynolds, Up in Arms supra, note 55,
at I1; Patriot Games, TIME, Dec. 19, 1994, at 48.
92. It would be possible, of course, to avoid these problems by proclaiming that
the Second Amendment protects only a right of the states and then concluding
that the right does not "do" anything, but such an approach is so obviously deficient as to merit no rebuttal. As Henigan notes, and as its presence in the
hotly debated and highly important Bill of Rights rather obviously indicates,
the Second Amendment was certainly intended to do something. Henigan, supra note 6, at 116. Although there may be debate about what it was intended to
do, unquestionably, the Second Amendment has a purpose. To doubt that the
Second Amendment does anything, or to argue that it is now obsolete and
should be ignored might be called the "inkblot approach" after Robert Bork's
similar treatment of the Ninth Amendment, which he likened to a Rorschach
"inkblot" whose meaning could not be deciphered by judges. See The Bork
Disinformers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1987, at 22. Bork's treatment of the Ninth
Amendment was rightly ridiculed as an abdication of judicial-and intellectual-responsibility, and a similar approach to the Second Amendment
deserves the same degree of scorn.
93. Cf. sources cited in supra notes 3, 6.
94. For example, an advertisement, signed by 27 law professors smart enough
to know better, appeared in the New York Times. That advertisement said that
the Second Amendment protects only state militias "i.e., the National Guard."
The advertisement also suggested that any belief to the contrary was a "fraud"
that no respectable constitutional scholar endorsed. N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1994,
at A9. Compare id. with Glenn H. Reynolds, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES,
May 12, 1994, at A24 (quoting published articles by eminent professors of
constitutional law who support the interpretation that the Second Amendment
creates an individual right, and does not simply protect the National Guard).
95. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659,
677 (1987) ("Rule 8: If your history uniformly confirms your predilections, it is
probably bad history.").
96. "When, despite this distance [between 1787 or 1870 and the present] the
Framers] seem to confirm our deepest wishes, we must suspect that our portrait
of them is in fact a mirror of ourselves." Id. at 677-78.
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97. See Glenn H. Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning on the Right, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 1333, 1347-48 (1992) (arguing that there are good reasons for paying
closer attention to the text and the intent of the Framers, not in order to constrain judges, but rather, because "paying attention to the text and to what its
drafters were trying to accomplish is what the craft of lawyering is all about");
Glenn H. Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 110, 114
(1991) (noting that "it is unlikely that the Court will ever reach a truly 'final'
answer to very many questions that come before it"); Glenn H. Reynolds, Sex,
Lies and Jurisprudence: Robert Bork, Griswold, and the Philosophy of Original
Understanding, 24 GA. L. REV. 1045, 1108 (1990) ("[N]o additional judicial
discipline would be imposed by the adoption and honest implementation of
'original understanding' jurisprudence.").

